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Within the context of spatial rebalancing and a Northern (metro-region) Powerhouse, this 
article explores the implementation of the devolution of employment and skills within the 
Sheffield city region. We make both an original empirical and analytical contribution by 
suggesting that notions of governance and metagovernance failure are important for ana-
lyzing the development, tensions and contradictions of city region economic governance 
within the context of the UK Government’s devolution and localism agenda (in particu-
lar “Devolution Agreements”). We consider that governance failure arises because of the 
primacy of a neoliberal-dominated strategy orientation towards the market and its failure 
in the delivery of skills. Governance and metagovernance mechanisms are unable to suf-
ficiently coordinate effective responses to address a legacy of de-industrialisation, deep-
rooted labour market and sociospatial inequalities.
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Policy makers are not faced with a given prob-
lem. Instead they have to identify and formu-
late their problem … For all these reasons, 
there is all kinds of room for controversy over 
what ‘the problem’ is, and no way to settle the 
controversy by analysis. Here already, then, is 
a limit on analytic policy making, and a nec-
essary point of entry for ‘politics’ and other 
‘irrationalities’ in policy making (Lindbolm, 
1968: 13–14, emphasis removed).
Building on the City Deal agreed in 2012, the 
Growth Deals, agreed in July 2014 and January 
2015 and initial Devolution Agreement, agreed 
in December 2014, this Devolution Deal 
marks another step in the transfer of resources 
and power from central Government to the 
Sheffield City Region. This agreement will 
enable Sheffield City Region to accelerate 
the delivery of its Strategic Economic Plan, 
strengthening its position as a world class cen-
tre for advanced manufacturing and engineer-
ing (HM Government, 2015a: 3).
Chimera: a thing which is hoped for but is 
illusory or impossible to achieve. Synonyms: 
illusion, fantasy, delusion, dream, fancy 
(Oxford English Dictionary).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons. 
org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is 
properly cited.
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Devolution city-region economic and 
political geographies
Welcome to “Devo Sheffield”—a combined 
authority city-region that comprises the South 
Yorkshire council areas of Barnsley, Rotherham, 
Doncaster and Sheffield, alongside the East 
Midlands authorities of Bassetlaw, Bolsover, 
Chesterfield, Derbyshire Dales and North East 
Derbyshire. As a part of the ongoing process 
of constitutional change and devolution in 
the United Kingdom, city-regions in England 
are being brought to the centre-stage of pol-
icy and politics to address, first, paraphrasing 
Lindblom (1968), the “problem” of economic 
growth and a rebalancing of this geographi-
cally to iron out issues of spatial combined and 
uneven development (on which, see Martin, 
2015), and second, the “problem” of securing 
effective and accountable governance arrange-
ments, whereby effective economic growth and 
development is contingent on open engage-
ments with civil society. This model is being 
heavily influenced by the US “Metropolitics” 
agglomeration thinking of Katz and others, 
transferred at high speed into the UK with the 
creation of a “northern metro-region” spatial 
imaginary, elected “Metro-Mayors” (see RSA, 
2014), and promises of additional functions to 
local states to create the conditions for “real 
control” (Wharton, 2016: 9)—being made con-
crete, at least in political discourse and rheto-
ric, through politically charged notions of the 
“Northern Powerhouse” and the Cities and 
Local Government Devolution Act (see New 
Statesman, 2016).
“Devo Sheffield” was accordingly coined 
on the 12th December 2014 by the Liberal 
Democrats to capture a historic “Devolution 
Agreement” made between the Sheffield 
City-Region and Central Government, and 
as noted in the second quotation above 
(HM Government, 2015a), it builds on City 
Deal and Growth Deals, introduced by the 
Conservative Government to create the basis 
for a “journey that sees the people of Sheffield 
put in charge of their own economic destiny” 
(Otten, 2014: 1). Launched by Nick Clegg, MP 
for Sheffield Hallam (and at that time also 
leader of the Liberal Democrats and Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Coalition Government 
with the Conservatives), and following “Devo 
Manc” developments in Manchester, and sub-
ject to a directly elected Mayor being in place, 
“Devo Sheffield” promises to shift power 
from Whitehall to the Sheffield City-Region, 
anchored through a “big pot of money” £900 
million agreement (£30m of funding for 
30 years “immune from any spending review”), 
therein giving greater control over skills, trans-
port, housing and business support (Beardmore, 
2015: 8). Significantly, and hence the title of 
this article, Sheffield’s Devolution Agreement 
stall is largely concerned with locally making 
more of skills and employment; local coun-
cils and businesses will have control over the 
majority of the circa £150 million skills budget 
(2015–2021) for the first time. By combining 
skills with employment opportunities for all, 
through devolved funding, integrating systems 
and working towards local commissioning for 
increased powers from central government, the 
city-region is becoming responsible for “build-
ing a new skills system” (HM Government, 
2015b). In short, “Devo Sheffield” is a “historic 
moment for the great city”, giving responsibili-
ties to local leaders to push forward plans to 
strengthen the economy, and “without waiting 
for Whitehall to do something to the regions 
of England”, again (Beardmore, 2015: 8). The 
promise of a new city-regional era has been 
made, a “quiet revolution is underway” (HM 
Government, 2015b: 2), even a “second indus-
trial revolution” (Burnett, 2016: 22), where skills 
and employment are the keys to unlocking this 
blighted post-industrial city, and according 
to the words of Chancellor George Osborne, 
“blazing a trail” for the rest of the UK, and 
beyond (Beardmore, 2015: 8).
These timely policy developments in 
England have deep ramifications for contem-
porary urban and regional political economy. 
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Firstly, they hit head-on the new neoclassical 
urban economics city-region building agenda 
of Storper, Overman, Glaeser and others. 
Storper’s Keys to the City, the leading account 
on how economics, institutions, social action 
and politics shape development, for instance, 
makes the bold claim that “[c]ity-regions are 
the principal scale at which people experience 
lived reality”, hence understanding city-region 
development is “more important that ever” 
and “managing it will pose one of the most 
critical challenges to humanity” (Storper, 2013: 
4). Focusing on the microfoundations of indi-
viduals, households, firms and groups interact-
ing to make cities and change them, Storper’s 
concern is more often than not with the notions 
of “wining” and “super-star” regions and cities 
(Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2014: 213); the “big 
game to be hunted” (Storper, 2013: 4) appears 
to be charting growth and change to find suc-
cess. We hear much less (and mostly nothing) 
in these literatures about “ordinary” regions 
that have experienced extensive de-industri-
alisation and face continual challenges. These 
accounts are often found elsewhere (see Bailey 
and Berkeley, 2014; Beatty and Fothergill, 2014; 
Meegan et al., 2014), and both agendas need to 
be connected, which we seek to address here.
Second, “Devo Sheffield” talks loudly to the 
decade of debates on state spatial restructuring 
(Brenner, 2004) and changes to the landscape 
of economic governance and public policy 
more broadly (Keating, 2013). This restruc-
turing has often involved a tendency towards 
devolving employment and labour market 
policies and functions to cities and regions. 
There is a now a considerable body of litera-
ture which highlights the inherent tensions, 
conflicts and contradictions embodied in these 
governance changes—for example, the ten-
sions and conflicts between central and local 
objectives, competition and cooperation and 
entrepreneurial versus social inclusion objec-
tives and also issues of power and representa-
tion (Danson et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2012; 
Pike et al., 2015). This article argues that, and 
demonstrates how, all this is being intensified, 
and not resolved, through the processes and 
practices of devolution. 
Moreover, we seek to make a distinctive 
analytical contribution within and between 
these cognate literatures. With the exception 
of recent work on austerity urbanism and 
state failure in this journal (Peck, 2014), there 
are also theoretical and empirical silences in 
both these literatures on issues of “regulatory 
capacity” and “regulatory deficits” (Painter 
and Goodwin, 2000). The next section of this 
article accordingly bridges both concerns and 
analyzes the nature and limits to devolved 
city region building and particularly devolved 
labour market governances that feature so 
strongly in the “Devo Sheffield” devolution 
settlement.1 With no regulatory powers and 
limited direct control and additional financial 
capacity, we suggest that “Devo Sheffield” is 
deeply bound-up with the contradictions fac-
ing (British) capitalism and the various gov-
ernment priorities in responding to them. The 
article thus raises deep and timely questions 
on the British growth model, analyses of state 
intervention therein and (transferable) dilem-
mas of city-region building in advanced capital-
ism. This is a “chimera”—an apt phrase that is 
only occasionally used in geographical analy-
sis (see Bailey and Turok, 2001; Zuege, 1999) 
to describe state projects that are imaginative, 
even dazzling at times, though deeply implausi-
ble when unpacked in reality.
To push our conceptual and theoreti-
cal understandings further, the article then 
suggests that notions of governance and 
metagovernance failure are important in 
terms of understanding both the limitations 
to and contradictions of devolution and 
city-region building. Metagovernance—the 
“government of governance” through “over-
seeing, steering, and coordinating governance 
arrangements” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 
11)—has received minimal detailed atten-
tion in urban and regional studies (except by 
Whitehead, 2003), it is timely to engage with 
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these agendas, to show how and where geog-
raphy matters and we would go as far as to 
suggest that devolution through city regions 
in England is producing spatially articulated 
metagovernance failures. Governance failure 
arises because of the primacy of a neoliberal-
dominated strategy orientation towards the 
market and its failure in the delivery of skills. 
Governance and metagovernance mecha-
nisms are unable to sufficiently coordinate 
effective responses to address a deep legacy 
of de-industrialisation, deep-rooted labour 
market and social inequalities. Depoliticized 
metagovernance coordination conflicts sig-
nal an ongoing democratic deficit in terms of 
accountabilities and transparency, which in 
itself leads to legitimation problems within 
and between partnerships and in relation to 
wider civil society. The fourth section offers 
some conclusions and suggests avenues for 
future social science research on the metago-
vernance of devolved economic and political 
geographies. 
“Slagheap to innovation district”? 
The restructuring of economic 
governance and skills in Sheffield
Sheffield is the fourth largest city in England 
and is located in the South Yorkshire coalfield. 
Its economic base comprises steel making and 
engineering, and its politics was formed from a 
strong labour and trade union movement tra-
dition, with the local authority controlled for 
many years by the Labour Party and with an 
active Communist Party which influenced work 
place and city politics. Sheffield was the cen-
tre point of the 1984–1985 miners’ strike and 
prior to that the steel-workers’ strike, which 
attempted to resist large scale restructuring and 
closures. In early 1980s, the city became a focal 
point of resistance to the Thatcher Government, 
with the local authority taking a proactive role 
in developing local economic initiatives, partic-
ularly in terms of employment and training. It 
promoted a progressive redistributive strategy 
against the dominant neoliberal politics of 
Thatcherism.
From the mid-1980s though, both the econ-
omy and political governance landscape were 
to change markedly. Between 1979 and 1982, 
45,000 jobs were shed in the core engineering 
and steel industries. Its employment and occupa-
tional structure has been transformed over the 
past 20 years (hence ‘Slaghead to innovation dis-
trict’2), from a high-paid employment economy 
with a plentiful supply of skilled jobs to an econ-
omy where many of the new jobs created in the 
service sector tend to be low-paid. Also of impor-
tance is the existence of significant proportions 
of the working age population categorised as 
economically inactive and in receipt of sickness 
benefits, and where labour market exclusion and 
poverty occurs at a significant scale. Skills polar-
isation and segmentation thus became integral 
features of the labour market. Sheffield faces 
some distinctive skills challenges on both the 
supply and demand side of the labour market 
equation. On the demand side, the proportion of 
employers lacking any sort of strategic approach 
to the skills of their workforce is higher than the 
national average in Sheffield. On the supply side, 
a smaller proportion of the northern workforce 
possesses a degree and larger proportions have 
no qualifications. In some areas this results in 
a vicious circle of low skills and low productiv-
ity, or the “low-skills equilibrium” (Henderson 
et al., 2013).
During the 1980s the Thatcher Government’s 
neoliberalism had two major impacts—first, 
that the politics of redistribution was replaced 
by the politics of the market, where private 
interests were accorded prominence in terms of 
access to and as beneficiaries of urban policy. 
The second impact, and one that was related, 
was the shift in representational structures that 
increasingly marginalized the role of local gov-
ernment and the electoral democratic process, 
challenging traditional models of accountabil-
ity in public services. A raft of private sector-led 
initiatives were developed, including Training 
and Enterprise Councils, as devolved bodies 
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to cities and subregions charged with making 
the skills and training market. Despite there 
being serious, historical evidence-based, limits 
to creating an employer-led training market, 
New Labour continued with supply-side and 
market-driven skills policies. The devolution 
of employment and skills was a key element of 
New Labour’s skills strategy through “centrally 
controlled” Local Skills Councils (LSCs), along 
with Regional Development Agencies and 
Sector Skills Councils charged with coordinat-
ing skills strategies across the regions. The City 
Strategy Pathfinder (CSP) pilot was accord-
ingly established in 2006 with the primary aims 
of devolving welfare-to-work programmes for 
tackling worklessness and integrating employ-
ment and skills strategies. The CSP was seen as 
a vehicle to promote an element of devolved 
responsibility to local partnerships in deliver-
ing Pathways and was thus seen as a bottom-
up process—partnerships and consortia were 
formed by local employment services along 
with local authorities, the private, voluntary 
and community sectors, where there was some 
discretion given to develop their own priori-
ties and innovate with project development 
(Etherington and Jones, 2009).
The UK Government’s skills policy, 2010–
2015, was focused on further deregulation 
and on freeing colleges and training organisa-
tions from central and other external control 
in order to create a purchaser provider mar-
ket for skills at the city level (see BIS, 2010). 
Furthermore, the coordination of skills has 
been put firmly in the hands of employer-led 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEP), estab-
lished at the city-region spatial scale with a 
remit to regenerate local economies through 
investment in business and infrastructure. The 
Sheffield Local Enterprise Partnership, estab-
lished in 2011 and bringing together local 
partnerships within the city-region partners, 
envisaged some link-up with both the employ-
ment (i.e. the Government’s flagship welfare-
to-work programme for long term unemployed 
the Work Programme) and skills agenda (i.e. 
apprenticeships and work based vocational 
training) (McNeil, 2010). Within this new gov-
ernance and policy regime, the Sheffield City 
Council initiated its Employment and Skills 
Strategy in 2012, which is coordinated by the 
Sheffield First Partnership established under 
the previous New Labour administration. 
A simplified overview of the structure of skills 
governance is shown in Figure 1.
The Government subsequently established 
“City Deals” as a means of first, seeking to 
resolve the coordination problems and politi-
cal conflicts that accompany the new (and 
old) governance arrangements (see UKCES 
and Centre for Cities, 2015). Through skills 
and employment policies, City Deals are sec-
ond seen as integral features of devolving 
funding to create the conditions for “open 
innovation”—a perspective on innovation dis-
tricts where economy shaping, place making 
and social networking come together, “mingle” 
and are claimed to move places like Sheffield 
“up the value chair of global competitiveness 
by growing firms, networks and traded sectors 
that drive broad-based prosperity” (Katz and 
Wagner, 2014: 1). Sheffield LEP, in conjunc-
tion with the Sheffield City Region’s Skills 
and Employment Partnership, has accordingly 
obtained the ability to control part of the skills 
budget so that it can respond more effectively 
to local business needs. The brokerage model, 
deemed necessary to “stimulate businesses to 
invest in skills”, initially outlined in the docu-
ment “Made in Sheffield—a deal for growth” 
(Sheffield LEP 2013b, 2014), sought to match 
local contributions (public and private) with 
national funding (on which, see Payne and 
Keep, 2011).
In turn, this has led to the “Sheffield City 
Region Agreement on Devolution” (HM 
Government, 2014) and the later “Sheffield 
City Region Combined Authority Devolution 
Deal” (HM Government, 2015a), which is 
currently considering different options for 
improving local governance and account-
ability. The Combined Authority is “exercising 
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Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise 
Partnership (City-Region includes South 
Yorkshire and parts of N.E. Derbyshire –
Combined Authority Status 2014)
Private sector -led body for promoting business 
development, infrastructure place marketing and 
growth. SLEP comprising
• Sheffield City Region (SCR) Skills for 
Growth and Employment Partnership
managing the ‘Growth Deal’ (2015-2021), 
• Commitment to develop and deliver an 
SCR Investment Fund, Skills Capital 
Fund, developing a ‘Skills Bank’ which 
will capture business rate uplift and has 
skills improvements as one of its princip al
objectives.
• SCR apprenticeship model to tackle youth 
unemployment and provide young people 
with the opportunities to obtain the skills 
which will empower them to have 
prosperous futures in a high skilled SCR 
economy.
• Create at least 4,000 additional 
apprenticeships that can be delivered 
within a three-year timeframe
• Intelligence and forecasting relating to 
business skills needs.
.
Work Programme (Welfare to 
Work) South Yorkshire Contract 
Area 
Two Prime Contractors for
delivering welfare-to-work 
programmes in South Yorkshire –
covers major part of the city region.
18 subcontractors delivering 
counselling, personalised 
interventions services and 
employability programmes for 
people on long term unemployment. 
Skills conditionality part of the WP 
whereby people identified with no 
qualifications are obliged to 
undertake training. WP providers 
can signpost people to training.
Sheffield First Partnership Executive Board (for local authority area)
Employment and SkillsTask Force (Employment and Skills Strategy), focusing
on six priority areasfor action:
• Improving employer involvement in developing initiatives to tackle
worklessness.
• Harnessing economic development and business growth initiatives, connecting
people to opportunities that arise from major developments, inward investments 
and large scale public sector contracts.
• Removing and managing health barriers to work, tackling the main health
conditions which are causing worklessness and sickness in Sheffield and 
preventing newly unemployed people becoming long term unemployed due to 
developing health conditions.
• Providing skills for work and progression through an integrated approach to
employment and skills and tackling the low skills levels of many benefits 
claimants.
• Supporting vulnerable groups and workless families, improving their work 
opportunities and life chances and tackling labour market disadvantage.
• Increasing work and progression opportunities for young people, through 
creating more apprenticeship, training, work experience and job opportunities.
Figure 1. Summary of skills governance for Sheffield City Region.
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
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management functions” in support of the LEP 
in implementing SCR’s skills and employment 
strategies, “representing” the democratic man-
date of local leaders and “providing account-
ability in terms of performance, finance and 
statutory obligations”. Moreover, Sheffield City-
Region is working with Government to deliver 
“integrated skills and training systems across 
the local area, driven by the needs of the econ-
omy and led by the private sector, giving local 
businesses the skilled labour they need to grow”. 
A  £17 million Skills Bank, governed not by 
local partners but by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC), is operating to improve the skills base 
of the workforce, changing the way the skills 
system operates, by “placing the purchasing 
power for skills in the hands of employers”. 3
By 2018/2019, the Sheffield City-Region will 
have full devolved responsibilities in relation 
to adult skills funding and provision (for those 
aged 19+). The LEP and Combined Authority 
will form a joint venture partnership with the 
Skills Funding Agency, which will be responsible 
for ensuring that a new, forward-looking system 
is in place by 2017. This arrangement will cover 
the Adult Skills Budget (other than participation 
funding for apprenticeships and traineeships); 
the Apprenticeship Grant for Employers (AGE); 
and through an enhanced version of its existing 
Skills Bank, Sheffield City Region will play a cen-
tral role in enabling businesses, especially SMEs, 
to take up and invest in apprenticeships. Working 
within Government’s reform agenda for appren-
ticeships in which funding will be increasingly 
routed directly to employers, the Deal will ena-
ble businesses to liaise either with the SCR Skills 
Bank or directly with Government. Sheffield 
City-Region will also work in partnership with 
the National Careers Service on the “Inspiration” 
agenda to coordinate employer-education activ-
ity more effectively, building on the existing 
Enterprise Advisors pilot.
The other major (and often silent) policy initia-
tive relates to welfare-to-work through the Work 
Programme (WP), involving a “provider led” 
approach in which welfare-to-work services for 
longer term unemployed will be delivered by the 
private sector—usually large scale organisations 
(“prime” contractors), where other support ser-
vices are subcontracted usually to the voluntary 
sector. A “black box” approach to the tendering 
has been adopted, essentially leaving the “prime” 
contractors to put together a package of employ-
ment support, which meets the specific needs of 
the local area. Contracting processes—steered 
from the centre by the Department of Work and 
Pensions and having a pricing structure with a 
payment-by-results performance framework—
are central to the governance of this. As part of 
this model of delivery, the long-term unemployed 
can be sign-posted to training as part of their per-
sonalised support. The programme for the South 
Yorkshire contract area (covering most of the 
Sheffield CR) is delivered by two multinational 
companies—People Plus (formerly A4e) and 
Serco. Under the Devolution Agreements, the 
Sheffield City-Region “will begin to prepare for 
local commissioning”, whereby funding is com-
bined through a single block allocation and imple-
mented according to “locally informed choices”.
The central elements of the two strategies are 
quite similar—promoting employability skills 
for people of school-leaving age, raising attain-
ment levels and developing apprenticeships. For 
the LEP, a key element of its focus is on business 
growth, and that strategies are linked to “flag-
ship” projects such as building on the “knowledge 
sectors” and promoting the “knowledge econ-
omy” (Sheffield LEP, 2012, 2014). The changing 
governance landscape described above involved 
changes in party control of Sheffield City Council, 
where the Liberal Democrats were replaced in 
2010 by a majority Labour party. In essence, the 
2000s were characterised in changing control of 
the local authority between these two parties. 
The current administration has had to manage 
a rapidly changing governance landscape and 
negotiate new relationships such as the LEP and 
Work Programme Providers. Alongside this, the 
Sheffield Labour Party established the Fairness 
Commission in 2012 in order to develop a more 
socially inclusive approach to employment, 
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welfare and the environment. At least in terms 
of political and policy rhetoric, the Sheffield City-
Region Devolution Agreements provides the 
basis for taking this forward. For policy-makers 
promoting Sheffield’s Advanced Manufacturing 
Innovation District, which stands on the 
“Orgreave site where Arthur Scargill led his mem-
bers from the National Union of Mineworkers as 
police clashed with them” (Burnett, 2016: 22), this 
is the “dawn of a new era”, providing the basis for 
a “21st Century export book beyond the volatile 
EU market with a high skilled, modern manu-
facturing economy, combining digital innovation; 
world class experience, academic research, and a 
strong global brand” (see HM Government, 2014, 
2015a). We now turn to consider some of the 
emerging on-the-ground contradictions and ten-
sions of these shifts in the governance and regu-
latory environments of labour markets and the 
economy more broadly.
Restructuring of representational 
structures, new accountabilities and 
ongoing democratic deficits
The Government “localism” agenda has involved 
a shift in responsibilities for labour market and 
skills policy to city-region actors, through the 
creation of the Local Enterprise Partnerships 
with a central role for the private sector in shap-
ing strategic economic development policy (Pike 
et al., 2015). The emphasis on employer engage-
ment and taking control of the skills agenda 
and market is a central plank of the LEP skills 
strategy (the Sheffield LEP Board is made up of 
10 “business leaders” from the private sector and 
nine local authority leaders). The shift towards 
the market in terms of the purchaser-provider 
relationship has created tensions within the LEP 
in terms of provider involvement in policy for-
mation. The college networks have voiced con-
cerns over their role on the LEP, where they have 
access to actually influencing or shaping skills 
policy rather than being seen as a “provider” of 
skills (Davies, 2011). The LEPs role is evolving 
at the time of writing, but its actual link with the 
existing raft of city partnerships is unclear.
This is also exemplified in the way welfare-to-
work programmes (i.e. the Work Programme) 
are delivered in the city region. The Work 
Programme has been devolved to regional/
sub-regional contract areas. The two providers, 
Serco and People Plus (formerly A4E), which 
cover the Sheffield area, involve a proliferation 
of sub-contractors mainly from the voluntary 
and private sectors. The influence of the local 
authority on the way welfare-to-work policy is 
being implemented is minimal and its engage-
ment highly constrained and limited to provid-
ing “wrap around” services (social, health and 
basic skills training) for more disadvantaged 
groups who are unable to access employment.
The Local authority raised critical questions at 
the early stage of the implementation of the Work 
Programme concerning the relationships between 
local partnerships and other services that support 
people into employment (Sheffield City Council, 
2011). The privatisation model of delivery has 
been identified by some voluntary sector stake-
holders as limiting the possibility of disadvan-
taged groups and communities in engaging and 
influencing policy. According to one source:
The competitive nature of the whole employ-
ment programme has reduces it to a cattle mar-
ket, where contracts are given based on criteria 
where unemployed and disadvantaged groups 
have no say (Voluntary Sector Submission, 
Sheffield Fairness Commission, 2011).
This view, concerning a lack of voice, seems to 
be common within the Sheffield community and 
voluntary sector. According to another source:
In recent times, involvement in voice, influ-
ence and participation in services has been 
reduced significantly. This is counter intui-
tive in the context of the localism agenda 
(Sheffield Third Sector Assembly, 2014).
The scepticism about the contracting model 
seems to be prevalent amongst stakeholders. For 
example, health-service professionals considered 
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that their views regarding the needs of people 
with long-term health conditions were not incor-
porated into the welfare-to-work programmes. 
The Work Programme offers opportunities for 
the larger voluntary sector organisations to 
deliver welfare-to-work interventions, but there 
are no guarantees that the more experienced 
voluntary sector organisations in the welfare-to-
work market, which have acquired the expertise 
in terms of delivery, will sustain themselves in 
light of their radically reduced grant allocations.
As the community and voluntary sectors are 
incorporated into the welfare market so their 
influence on policy has been reduced. This 
also occurred under the previous City Strategy 
Pathfinder in Sheffield implemented under New 
Labour, which promoted local commissioning 
and contracting in welfare services. According 
to an interview with one stakeholder:
The history of the role of the Sheffield 
partnerships seems to have given business 
interests a greater priority than an inclusive 
agenda. The aspirations of disadvantaged 
groups and communities has been neglected 
and there seems to be no indication that the 
new regime will be any different (the Labour 
Party took back control of the local authority 
from the Liberal Democrats in 2010) (inter-
view with Trade Union Official, 2014).
The increasing emphasis upon private provid-
ers via the Work Programmes seems to have 
led to a greater disillusion from the voluntary 
sector in terms of their ability to shape policies 
and decisions that affect disadvantaged groups. 
There is evidence that these tensions are preva-
lent within local government and NHS organi-
sations. The impact of the recession and cuts in 
funding to social programmes seems to have 
further destabilised local partnerships.
Austerity, uneven development and the 
employment crisis
A crucial element of the politics of uneven 
development is the way funding cuts and 
austerity measures are impacting on employ-
ment and skills provision. The City Council is 
facing a significant financial crisis—the rev-
enue budget shortfall has been estimated to be 
between £53/57 million in 2012/2013 and £154–
170 m in 2015/2016. So far, the budget cuts have 
taken place also within the local educational 
providers such as Sheffield College, a major 
public sector training provider, that involved 
job losses and redundancies. In relation to 
skills, as Ewart Keep observes, the reductions 
in the government’s Employment and Training 
spending announced on 26 June 2013 represent 
the point at which the entire edifice of tradi-
tional skills policy started to look unstable and 
probably unsustainable, particularly for provi-
sion beyond the compulsory phase of initial 
schooling. Between 2010/2011 and 2014/2015, 
cuts totalling 24.3% have been made in the 
overall Department of Business Innovation 
and Skills (DBIS) budget. Within this overall 
settlement, the DBIS and Further Education 
budget was reduced by approximately 25%. On 
current projections, the overall reduction in the 
DBIS budget between 2010 and 2018 is esti-
mated to be 42.5% (Keep, 2014: 5).
Although there is no exact estimate of the 
skills funding gap in the Sheffield City-Region, 
skills surveys provide some insights into 
employer demand for skill funding. Businesses 
have reported, for instance, that they would 
be able to commit more financial resources to 
training if trading conditions were more stable 
or there was more certainty over the economy, 
and they would be more likely to use external 
training providers if there was greater public 
subsidy (42%) or lower course fees (34%), or 
if training was more tailored to their business 
needs (38%). Providers in Sheffield City Region 
were less likely to report being unable to meet 
demand, and over two-thirds of the providers in 
the Sheffield City Region would have liked to 
be able to offer new or different provision, but 
feel they are unable to do so, mainly because of 
uncertainties over funding and/or the need for 
capital investment (Ekosgen, 2012). The current 
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Sheffield CR LEP Strategic Economic Plan sets 
out an ambitious funding and project plan in 
order to close the skills and employment gap 
within the city region, which also entails consid-
erable devolution of control of the way funding 
is managed and spent (Sheffield City Region 
Local Enterprise Partnership, 2014). There is 
inevitably a question over whether the funding 
that will contribute to the creation of 70,000 new 
jobs will be forthcoming from the Government 
in the context of current austerity plans.
The continued “underperformance” of the 
city-region economy is a cause for concern 
among local politicians and stakeholders (see 
Sheffield First Partnership, 2016b). An important 
example is the persistent jobs gap and shortfall, 
which characterises the labour market. The jobs 
gap is calculated by comparing the employment 
rates, i.e. the share of adults of working age who 
have jobs between different areas. The worst dis-
tricts had an average employment rate of 68% 
compared with best group of districts compris-
ing 79%. The number of jobs required in the 
worst districts to reach the national average and 
the “best” districts is then calculated, and this 
would involve significant numbers of new jobs 
that need to be created—(Beatty and Fothergill, 
2014; Sheffield First Partnership, 2010: 25). 
Furthermore a “prosperity gap” of over £1.1 bil-
lion, due to a combination of economic inactiv-
ity, unemployment and low productivity sectors, 
characterises the local economy. It is estimated 
(see above) that an additional 70,000 jobs will 
need to be created within the SCR to “narrow 
the gap” with other parts of the country. It is, 
however, important to view this challenge in the 
context that other comparator areas will also 
grow. Based on the forecast growth in other parts 
of the country, the SCR would need to create 
around 120,000 jobs to have closed the gap with 
the national average in 2024. This would require 
GDP growth of almost 5% and “nowhere in the 
UK grows at this rate for such a sustained period 
of time” (Sheffield LEP 2014: 22).
Sheffield experiences skills polarisation and 
has a larger proportion of higher skilled peo-
ple and University graduates than the national 
average (Sheffield First Partnership, 2016a). 
Weak labour market conditions and limited job 
opportunities means that graduates are often 
taking low paid, lower skilled jobs and, as Table 1 
shows, there are significant numbers of people 
who possess no or low level qualifications. The 
number of pupils gaining 5+ GCSEs at grade 
Table 1. Labour market and skills indicators for Sheffield. 
Sheffield National
JSA claimants (insurance-based benefit) 17,795 (4.7%) 3.9%
ESA and IB (Sickness benefits) 24,600 (4.5%) 3.8%
Lone parents 5,600 (1.4%) 1.5%
Other on income related benefit 1,770 (0.5%) 0.4%
Overall unemployment rate (2013) 10.8% 7.8%
Employment gap 16,000
JSA claimants per unfilled vacancy 8.8% 5.0%
Vacancy notification change (2009–2010) 2.6% 34%
Low skills occupations 42% 38%
Medium skills occupations 20% 22%
High skills occupations 38% 40%
Level 4 skills 32.5% 32.5%
Level 2 skills 69.5% 69.5%
No qualifications 13.4% 11.3%
Establishments with any staff underemployed (City Region) 42% 47%
Source: Sheffield First Partnership (2012: 8, Sheffield First Partnership 2014: 30) Henderson et al. (2013) and Office for 
National Statistics.
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A*-C including English and maths is low (49%) 
compared to a national average (58%). As such, 
Sheffield has moved from being the third best 
Core City on this indicator in 2006/2007 to the 
seventh best (of 8) in 2010/2011. At a time when 
the skills levels required for many occupations 
continues to rise, this could preclude many 
young people from well paid work (Sheffield 
City Council, 2013: 73). This contributes to a 
more competitive labour market and displaces 
other people further down the skills ladder 
(creating further unemployment), but it also 
under-utilises the skills of graduates. Currently, 
SMEs are not considered as the “normal” route 
for graduate jobs (despite the fact they repre-
sent 95% of the business base in Sheffield) and 
graduates do not know how to access SME 
jobs. Furthermore, SMEs can be reluctant to 
take on graduates, often because they feel they 
cannot offer the time or structured training 
programmes graduates need to make the tran-
sition from university into the workplace (see 
Sheffield First Partnership, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
Sheffield First Partnership 2016a).
The economic downturn, the lack of good 
quality jobs and “sustainable” jobs is a key 
issue. In Sheffield, Job Seeker Allowance (JSA) 
claimants have increased from around 8,000 
pre–recession, to over 17,000 (2013), with young 
people aged 16–24 being particularly affected. 
In total there are 48,000 people claiming out-of-
work benefits (Sheffield City Council, 2013: 75). 
The ratio of job vacancies to unemployed people 
has declined dramatically, which when combined 
with a dramatic increase in long-term unemploy-
ment, is an important indicator of how the eco-
nomic downturn is impacting on Sheffield (see 
Table 1). With a mean average weekly wage of 
around £410, low-paid jobs compound these 
labour market dynamics (see Sheffield First 
Partnership, 2014: 17; Sheffield City Council, 
2011). Discussions have accordingly been tak-
ing place in recent years on the “fragility” of the 
economy, with an increasingly unstable labour 
market and increasing poverty being witnessed 
(Sheffield First Partnership, 2013, 2016a, 2016b).
Vulnerable groups in the labour market 
are experiencing the damaging effects of the 
emerging employment and skills crisis. For 
example, differences in occupations under-
taken by women showed an under-represen-
tation of female managers compared to the 
average in England, and the higher concen-
tration of women employed in services—a 
sector notorious for its unstable employment 
and training opportunities. For example, 32% 
of women were employed in caring and cus-
tomer service occupations compared to 7% of 
men (Sheffield First Partnership 2013, Sheffield 
First Partnership 2016a). As mentioned above, 
disabled people claiming incapacity benefit 
make up the largest cohort of people outside 
the labour market, and experience severe barri-
ers in terms of accessing employment and skills 
(Sheffield First Partnership, 2012: 20).
Lone parents who have also have been tar-
geted for welfare-to-work interventions through 
stricter benefit conditionality. This harsher work-
first regime is not seen to be effective in progress-
ing lone parents into sustainable employment. 
As one Lone Parent Advisor commented:
The new rules for lone parents make assump-
tions that people with children of school age 
are ‘ready’ for the labour market and are 
able to engage with work related activity. The 
assumption is that the person has sorted prob-
lems such as debt and relationship breakdown 
and often this is not the case. Furthermore one 
of the biggest barriers is accessing skills and 
this is currently a challenge due to the current 
funding arrangements (Interview, 2014).
The Work Programme (WP) performance 
for “signposting” disadvantaged groups into 
employment has generally been poor: Table  2 
shows employment outcomes compared with 
targets shows underperformance by providers in 
South Yorkshire. In theory, the WP should also 
be giving priority to sustaining employment (in 
employment for at least 26 weeks), which would 
mean that providers will give some priority to 
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clients accessing skills. There is a lack of data 
held at the Sheffield City-Region level to assess 
this, although national evaluations show that the 
WP is not providing sufficient opportunities for 
unemployed people to access training (Devin 
et al., 2011: iii). The National Institute of Adult 
Continuing Education (NIACE 2012), in its own 
survey of providers, found that 11 of 18 prime 
providers are committed to providing some ele-
ment of skills training, although this seems to be 
at a very basic level (e.g. online employability 
testing and basic IT skills). This suggests that:
Those who are disadvantaged will be provided 
limited opportunities to break from the low pay 
‘no pay-low pay’ cycle. This is why we see the 
skills strategy as important as welfare-to-work 
as a route into viable employment (Interview 
with Sheffield City Council Officer, 2014).
Because of the fear that contractors will over-
ride employment strategies produced by local 
partnerships, as occurred in certain instances 
under the previous City Strategy Pathfinder, 
the implementation of the Work Programme 
is creating further challenges for the strategic 
partnerships. As one stakeholder commented, 
“there is little incentive for the contractors to 
engage with the partnerships.” Another inter-
viewee observed “contractors are advised to 
link with local partnerships and it is not man-
datory. Nor is there likely to be any sanctions 
if they don’t” (Interview, 2014). The lack of 
public transparency in terms of the delivery 
model of Serco and People Plus was seen as 
a problem. A4e would not publicly consult on 
their delivery plan for confidential reasons 
(Interview, 2014).
A central element in enhancing skills of 
unemployed people and workers in Britain 
over the last 25 years is promoting the role of 
employer-sponsored training. Overall the track 
record for the UK is low compared with interna-
tional comparator countries, and Sheffield rein-
forces this pattern (see Lindsay et al., 2013). In 
2010, for instance, less than half of all employ-
ers surveyed in the Sheffield City-Region 
(49%) had a skills budget and had trained at 
least one member of staff. Furthermore, only 
25% of employers surveyed had invested, or 
were likely to invest in, apprenticeships. This 
pattern shows no signs of altering in the current 
(devolving) context: evaluation data highlights 
a “reticence of employers to use cash to fund 
activity [which] suggests work is still required 
to sell the benefits of training” (BIS, 2015: 12), 
and HM Treasury (2015: 24)  analysis reveals 
“a rapid decline in the amount and quality of 
training undertaken by employers over the 
last 20  years”. 4 The result is persistent weak 
innovation, poor receptiveness to new tech-
nologies and, as a consequence, low productiv-
ity and weak competitiveness (Sheffield First 
Partnership, 2013, 2016a, 2016b).
Table 2. Work programme outcomes for the Sheffield City Region.
Local authority Job outcome measures % covering first 24 months of referrals Unemployment rate
Doncaster 26 10
Barnsley 24 10
Rotherham 26 12
Sheffield 25 10
Chesterfield 30 4
Bolsover 39 3
NE Derbyshire 30 3
Derbyshire Dales 25 4
Best District: Hart 50 3
Worse District: Ceredigion 18 3
Source: CESI (2014).
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The political economy of governance 
and metagovernance
Despite the rhetoric of “localism” over the past 
5  years and “milestones” being claimed on a 
“devolution journey” (HM Government, 2015b: 
2), the different actors and coalitions of interests 
in the Sheffield City-Region are involved in a 
constant struggle to access, distribute and stake 
a claim in resources and influence. Sheffield’s 
Fairness Commission represents a turn towards 
a more socially inclusive agenda, although this 
in the context of outsourcing, deep cuts to the 
local state and implementation of austerity 
policies by the Council. There is no indication 
that the Labour-controlled Council is taking 
an oppositional position against the austerity 
policies; the cuts are being implemented, man-
aged and internalised within the Labour Party 
and the various partnerships. There is growing 
unrest within the city and protests appear to be 
intensifying. This is the context in which local 
policies are now being implemented—increas-
ing tensions and disaffectedness are now appar-
ent within the Town Hall and the partnerships 
(see Sheffield First Partnership, 2016b).
Given that under “Devo-Sheffield”, policy-
makers within the city and city region have given 
priority to upskilling and wider access to training, 
the gap between intentions and outcomes have 
never been greater, as the economy becomes 
more unstable and the continuing deregulated 
labour market gives rise to more pronounced 
social and spatial segmentation. The continued 
almost “path dependent” nature of policy dis-
courses around engaging employers and greater 
coordination of different stakeholders, policy 
regimes, budgets and partnerships represent 
a reworking of the governance arrangements 
to provide a “best fit” model to address the 
employment and skills crisis. So far, despite the 
“Fairness Commission” good intentions to recog-
nise at least the social divisions that are endemic 
features of contemporary restructuring, policy 
actors, politicians and business leaders are locked 
into the market model of delivery, neoliberalising 
modes of representation and subsequent failures 
in economic regulation. Sheffield clearly has a 
“deficit in local regulatory capacity” and some 
state forms and functions are clearly “counter-
regulatory” (Painter and Goodwin, 2000). How 
can we interpret what is happening here and also 
advance analytical debates in the social sciences?
Governance failure, i.e. the “failure to rede-
fine objectives in the face of continuing disa-
greement about whether they are still valid for 
the various partners” (Jessop, 2000: 18), is occur-
ring. There are a number of dimensions to gov-
ernance failure, which are embedded in local 
economic and social development. First, and as 
we have demonstrated, is the apparent tension 
between devolving responsibilities in relation 
to policy formation and implementation and 
the tendency towards centralisation in decision 
making, whereby local actors are charged with 
implementing nationally determined targets and 
programmes. The challenge here is the adapta-
tion of national programmes to local condi-
tions. Second is the increasing tendency towards 
institutional and policy fragmentation at the 
sub-regional level, with issues of accountability 
being raised. Governance becomes a new site 
for conflicts and political mobilisation, as the 
nature and complexity of partnerships means 
that involvement of more and more “actors” and 
“stakeholders” involved in the design and deliv-
ery of labour market programmes. Outcomes 
at one scale may dependent upon performance 
at another scale of governance, therefore co-
ordination dilemmas can occur. Furthermore, 
these coordination mechanisms may have dif-
ferent “temporal horizons” and there may be 
continuous tensions between short term and 
long term planning goals in policy planning. 
Third, and related, is the failure of current poli-
cies to address deep-rooted problems of labour 
market inequalities that are integral to market 
failure. This is exemplified in Sheffield by the 
employment gap and lack of sufficient sustain-
able employment growth to “revitalise” the city-
region economy. Finally, governance in the form 
of economic partnerships, dominated by private 
sector interests, is continuing to replace elected 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cjres/article-abstract/9/2/371/1745763 by M
iddlesex U
niversity user on 11 January 2019
384
Etherington and Jones
and representative government in terms of local 
economic development, which in itself poses a 
number of problems between government and its 
elected representation model of democracy and 
partnerships, and which tend to be elite-forming 
with blurred lines of accountability, often far 
removed from those who are disadvantaged and 
disenfranchised. Depoliticization is occurring, as 
opaque representational structure and lines of 
accountability close down and restrict possibili-
ties of negotiation and contestation.
As noted by Bakker, these processes have 
been neither “tidy in practice” nor “linear in fash-
ion”: market failures, state failures and govern-
ance failures coexist, “exhibit a range of failures”, 
and are used to justify the “problem” requiring 
ongoing state intervention. Moreover, as forms 
of governance become more widespread, as 
we have demonstrated, “the question of gov-
ernance failure becomes more acute” (Bakker 
2010: 45). Given the timely nature of city-region 
building occurring across the globe, finding an 
answer to governance failure is where debates 
could fruitfully focus next. “Metagovernance” 
offers one avenue for exploring this.
Metagovernance involves attempts to manage 
the ongoing complexity, plurality and tangled 
hierarchies characteristic of prevailing modes 
of coordination (see Jessop, 2000, 2008, 2015, 
2016). It involves, then, continually defining and 
redefining drawing boundary-spanning roles and 
functions, creating and recreating networking 
and linkage devices, sponsoring and redesign-
ing new institutions, identifying appropriate lead 
strategic institutions to coordinate other partners 
(in this case, the Sheffield City-Region Combined 
Authority), and continually generating discourses 
and narratives on the economy (the “shaping of 
context”, according to Jessop 2011) to facilitate 
relative geographical coherence through repeti-
tion of the “problems” to be addressed and the 
solutions to these. Government plays an increas-
ing role in metagovernance: providing the ground 
rules for governance and regulatory order in and 
through which governance partners can pursue 
their aims and seek to ensure the compatibility 
or coherence of different governance mecha-
nisms and regimes; seeking to balance and 
rebalance power differentials by strengthening 
weaker forces or systems in the interest of social 
cohesion or integration; and providing political 
responsibility in the event of governance failure 
(Whitehead, 2003). These emerging roles means 
that networking, negotiation, noise reduction 
and negative as well as positive coordination 
occur “in the shadow of hierarchy”. It also means 
that, as Jessop reminds us, there is “the need for 
almost permanent institutional and organiza-
tional innovation to maintain the very possibil-
ity (however remote) of sustained economic 
growth” (Jessop, 2000: 24). This is certainly the 
case in the Sheffield City-Region, which is being 
produced through a combination of political fiat, 
central government diktat and local state oppor-
tunism. The research agenda put down by Jessop 
for doing metagovernance, which we have sought 
to answer head-on with “Devo-Sheffield”, is the
extent to which the multiplying levels, arenas, 
and regimes of politics, policy-making, and 
policy implementation can be endowed with 
a certain apparatus and operational unity 
horizontally and vertically; and how this 
affects the overall operation of politics and 
legitimacy of the new political arrangements 
(Jessop, 2008: 222).
Effective governance and metagovernance, in 
turn, depends on displacing certain governance 
problems elsewhere and/or on deferring them into 
a more or less remote future. Whereas the posi-
tively charged devolution city-region policy dis-
courses framing the Sheffield problem point to a 
can-do “steering optimism”, where there is deemed 
to be a capacity to engage fruitfully and with pur-
pose to produce temporary spatio-temporal fixes, 
our analysis in this paper points to “steering pes-
simism” and a crisis of crisis-management. This 
article has highlighted the underlying long-term 
structural economic obstacles to effective govern-
ance and metagovernance, that, “by virtue of the 
simplification of the conditions of action, so often 
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lead to the “revenge” of problems that get ignored, 
marginalized, displaced, or deferred” (Jessop, 2011: 
117). This sort of simplification found in “Devo-
Sheffield” is evident in attempts to define problems 
as societal in scope and as requiring consensual 
governance, rather than as conflictual effects of 
exploitation, oppression or discrimination that 
can be only resolved by addressing fundamental 
structural and strategic patterns of domination. 
A website, with postings since the launch of “Devo 
Sheffield”, offers some insights into this:5
What is ‘Sheffield City Region? Is it an 
organisation, some sort of quango, a govern-
ment department? And how is it to be held 
accountable? Where’s the role for residents 
to steer changes and set the agenda?
Sounds like a glorified talking shop. There 
has been virtually no discussion of these City 
Deals … for me this is a backward step not a 
forward one.
The problem is … this handout to City 
Regions will be instead of a comprehensive 
devolution agenda, but is simply yet another 
last minute sticking plaster to hide the fact 
that noting of substance has been achieved 
by yet another government.
Metagovernance futures: devolution, 
dynamics and dilemmas
Depoliticizing conflicts in order to settle 
them, or stripping otherness of any yardstick 
the better to solve its problems—this is the 
madness which our time identifies with a rea-
sonable and easy democracy that harmonizes 
state initiatives with the nature tendencies of 
productive society, with its efforts and desires 
(Rancière, 2007: 105–106).
Within the context of spatial rebalancing and 
a Northern (metro-region) Powerhouse, this 
article has explored the implementation of the 
devolution of employment and skills frame-
works within the Sheffield City Region. The UK 
Conservative Government has taken a “localist” 
approach to urban regeneration, which posi-
tions subregional economic development and 
city-region building as the primary policy tools 
for growth and also tackling spatial inequalities. 
There is certainly a gap in our knowledge in terms 
of how city-region growth strategies, welfare-to-
work programmes and employment and skills 
initiatives contribute to economic and employ-
ment growth, and we have sought to address this, 
as well highlighting the complex issues around 
facilitating access to employment and skills by 
disadvantaged groups and geographical areas.
On this, we have highlighted three main ten-
sions in the current devolution settlement, as 
applied to the Sheffield City-Region through 
the Devolution Agreements. First, devolution is 
doing very little to address economic and social 
disadvantage in the Sheffield City-Region, which 
is stubbornly embedded on several levels: there 
is a relative low level of economic performance, 
with GVA ranked 38 out of 39 city-regions; the 
lack of employment demand and poor jobs 
growth compounds this, with, as noted above, 
an additional 70,000 jobs needed to narrow the 
gap with other parts of the country; low pay, skills 
and in-work poverty mean that work is not an 
automatic route out of poverty; disability health 
and labour market disadvantage is a significant 
policy challenge; women and young people are 
particularly disadvantaged in terms of employ-
ment and pay, with a higher proportion of women 
paid below the living wage compared to men in 
the Sheffield City-Regions, and some 22% of 
16–24 years old unemployed (see Hunt, 2015).
Second, employment and skills provision is com-
pounding this through policy fragmentation, lim-
ited transparency and accountabilities. According 
to some stakeholders, the city-region as an eco-
nomic entity faces challenges primarily due to 
overlapping boundaries—three local authorities 
are in two city regions, and the Derbyshire local 
authorities are also involved with employment 
and skills initiatives developed by Derbyshire 
Employment and Skills Board. The lack of bound-
ary alignment underlines an inherent problem 
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with coordinating city-region and local authority 
employment initiatives with Work Programme 
providers. The growth model in itself will contrib-
ute to increased numbers of jobs but there is a 
view that these will not be accessed by disadvan-
taged groups. There is a concern that this model 
is weak in terms of social inclusion policies and 
that it restricts the voice of disadvantaged groups 
to be heard within the city-region policy process. 
Moreover, there have been weak links between 
welfare-to-work programmes and city-region ini-
tiatives and partnerships. The Work Programme 
seems to have been “parachuted” into the regions 
with relatively little consideration in terms of how 
provision is coordinated with local services.
Third, in the context of austerity, funding cuts 
are adversely impacting on the employment and 
skills system and the devo “big pot of money” (see 
above) are not plugging this gap. The National 
Audit Office (2015) reports that over the 5-year 
period 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 the government will 
have spent £6.2 billion on local growth programmes, 
including that spent via RDAs and their legacy and 
spending on new funds and structures. By compari-
son, the RDAs spent £11.2 billion over the preced-
ing 5-year period 2005/2006 to 2009/2010. Adult 
Skills budget cuts have been ongoing for a number 
of years and we would argue is unsustainable. The 
Government is clearly prioritising apprenticeships 
in terms of skills policies and funding and an issue 
raised is how disadvantaged groups are to access 
Apprenticeships, given the importance of FE 
Colleges, which are experiencing funding cuts as 
we highlighted, in providing training for disadvan-
taged groups. The Government will have reduced 
its funding to local authorities by an estimated 
37% by 2015–2016. A  significant funding gap is 
emerging within local government as a result of 
this and we have underlined how local authority 
cuts are undermining and hindering the effective-
ness of skills and employment programmes. Those 
services that are crucial to assisting disadvantaged 
groups into employment are delivered or coordi-
nated by local authorities and are being cut back. 
We would argue that these cuts are hindering city-
region growth objectives.
City-region building frameworks clearly have 
a long way to go to address these dilemmas, and 
the current obsession with deal-making public 
policy, which is “founded upon territorial compe-
tition and negotiation between central and local 
actors unequally endowed with information and 
resources, leading to highly imbalanced and ineq-
uitable outcomes across the UK” (O’Brien et al., 
2015: 14), will only compound the deeply historical 
problem of uneven growth that is occupying much 
media attention in the UK (see Pike et al., 2016). 
Building on the innovative thinking of colleagues 
seeking to effectively spatial rebalance the econ-
omy in advanced capitalism (Martin et al., 2015), 
we would favour approaches that offer growth 
based on social inclusion (adopt options which 
ensure that economic activities are more jobs rich, 
the poorest benefit the most); exercise redistribu-
tion and fairness (central government needs to 
acknowledge that the poorest areas, after decades 
of deindustrialisation and underinvestment, need 
a “hand up”); promote excellent public services to 
attract economic success (we need a new central 
local relationship, founded on trust and a genuine 
localism, which appreciates the wider value of local 
government activity and strengthens local capac-
ity to act in the interest of local people, communi-
ties and places). This in turn suggests the need for 
inclusive and accountable models of governance 
and commissioning; a needs-based approach to 
employment and skills; a targeted job creation pro-
gramme; refocusing the outcomes of employment 
support on earnings and not performance indica-
tors based on benefit off-flows; and targeting funds 
around integrated employment and skills to pro-
vide in-work support and progression.
Last, in terms of its analytical contribution, 
the key arguments put forward are that con-
cepts of governance failure and metagovernance 
are important for analyzing the development, 
tensions and contradictions of city-region eco-
nomic governance within the context of the UK 
Government’s devolution and localism agenda 
(in particular “Devolution Agreements”). Using 
the tools of geographical political economy, per-
haps it is time to grasp the contradictions of space 
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and start thinking about “devolved” city-region 
building as spatially-articulated metagovern-
ance failure, where different and multiple spatial 
frameworks appear to be operating at the same 
time and evoking a crisis of crisis-management 
(Jessop, 2016). The displacement of contradic-
tions witnessed here, which are likely to be repli-
cated across the Northern Powerhouse, and which 
are providing the basis for the reproduction of 
the sociospatial relations of capitalism, certainly 
warrants a detailed comparative analysis across 
the UK and beyond. On this, and building on the 
quotation above from Rancière (2007), there is an 
urgent need to consider the links between, in this 
case, the ongoing depoliticization of economic 
development and its governance in and through 
the existence of what have been termed “post-
democratic” and “post-political” frameworks of 
performative and situated (apparent) consen-
sus building (see Allmendinger and Haughton, 
2012), and the ongoing “march of neoliberalism” 
(Hall, 2011: 6) as a market-making machine con-
tinually depoliticizing the social through its econ-
omization. Behind the chimera of the Sheffield 
City-Region is an ongoing brutal logic of labour 
market segmentation, flexibilization and shifts 
in power relations between capital and labour 
through the weakening of collective bargaining 
and employment rights, creating the conditions 
for control over work arrangements and the cas-
ualization of employment (part-time, temporary 
and zero-hour jobs). We must, as Rancière (2007: 
106) points out, “repoliticize [these] conflicts so 
that they can be addressed, restore names to the 
people and give politics back its former visibility 
in the handling of problems and resources”.
Endnotes
1 The research draws on funded projects, undertaken 
between 2009 and 2016, deploying semi-structured 
interviews with labour market policy actors and city-
region stakeholders, as well as extensive discourse 
and narrative policy analysis, to collectively get a 
handle on how policy problems are constructed and 
told and interventions subsequently formulated (on 
which, Jessop, 2013).
2 This locality booster-phrase is taken from the 
Northern Powerhouse call-to-arms expressed by Sir 
Keith Burnett, Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Sheffield (see Burnett, 2016: 22).
3 The key responsibilities of PwC are to manage “the 
procurement of training providers, employer engage-
ment and marketing, operation of triage and broker-
age services, supporting development of Skills Deals 
and overall contractual, performance and financial 
management of the fund”. See http://sheffieldcityre-
gion.org.uk/skills-bank/ (Accessed 18 March 2016).
4 Despite this, the Chair of Sheffield City-Region 
LEP, James Newman, stated: “2015 is a year of oppor-
tunity for the Sheffield City Region. My legacy is for 
the private sector to be engrained in every aspect 
of economic development” (http://www.rothbiz.
co.uk/2015/01/news-5002-sheffield-city-region-
secures.html (Accessed 18 March 2016). The HM 
Treasury solution (after highlighting private sector 
enabled market forces and historical voluntarism 
as the problem) supports this: “A new approach is 
needed which puts [large] employers at the heart of 
paying for and choosing apprenticeship training” 
(HM Treasury, 2015: 24).
5 See http://www.libdemvoice.org/devo-sheffield-
announced-transport-skills-business-support-hous-
ing-no-mayor-43737.html (Accessed 18 March 2016).
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